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FINDING EQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORING DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS IN THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF
THE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2009
Laura Hough*

INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA).1 The bill is designed to provide the federal government additional tools to “investigate and prosecute mortgage, corporate, and other financial
frauds. . . . that contributed to the current subprime and economic crisis, and to recover
taxpayers’ money lost to these frauds.”2 A significant portion of the law amends the
False Claims Act (FCA) in an attempt to combat fraudulent claims for payment submitted to the federal government.3 The FERA amendments to the FCA will effectuate
heightened government scrutiny over claims made by contractors to the government
and will expand FCA liability.
The more dramatic change to the FCA directly responds to the unanimous Supreme
Court decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders.4 In Allison
Engine, the Court held that contractors who unintentionally submitted fraudulent claims
to the government for payment could not be prosecuted under the FCA.5 The language
of FERA, however, no longer requires that false claims made to the government be
intended to result in the government’s retention of payment.6 Thus, the government
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2010.
1
Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
2
SYED D. ALI ET AL., GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME ALERT:
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http://www
.klgates.com/files/Publication/19c4ac72-4ac4-41a5-973f-027cf3e59978/Presentation/Pub
licationAttachment/a3e1096c-fafd-4d38-ab1e-3bd74c616842/Alert_FERA_052609.pdf.
3
See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4(a) (codified at 31
U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2011)).
4
553 U.S. 662 (2008).
5
Id. at 665.
6
Section 4 of FERA provides that any person who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property
to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property
to the Government, is liable to the United States Government . . . .
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4(a)(1). The statute no longer requires that there be an intent to defraud. See id.
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may now prosecute not only those who intentionally sought to defraud the government,
but also those contractors who may have accidentally made a false claim that seemed
fraudulent. Furthermore, Congress stipulated that this provision must apply retroactively to claims pending in the federal courts as of June 7, 2008, two days before the
Court’s decision in Allison Engine.7 That this provision expands liability and that it
applies retroactively raises serious due process concerns which, combined with other
provisions enacted by FERA, causes one to raise eyebrows at the manner in which the
federal government has swept the rights of potential defendants under the table.
Indeed, an examination of the new provisions that FERA adds to the FCA regarding qui tam whistleblowers8 demonstrates the government’s lack of concern for
the due process rights of potential defendants.9 Specifically, for purposes of filing
complaints in intervention, the government’s complaint in intervention may now relate
back to the qui tam whistleblower’s complaint, regardless of the number of times the
government renews the seal period during which it decides whether or not to intervene.10 The renewal effectively expands the statute of limitations.11 This provision
settled the debate over whether a government complaint in intervention could relate
back to the relator’s complaint or if only amendments made by the relator could relate
back. Further, prior to FERA, “relators were often denied access to” information produced by defendants in response to government subpoenas served on defendants during
the seal period.12 FERA, however, amends the FCA to read: “Any information obtained
by the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General under this section may
be shared with any qui tam relator if the Attorney General or designee determine it is
7

JONES DAY, FRAUD ENFORCEMENT RECOVERY ACT OF 2009 BECOMES LAW, EXPANDING
EXPOSURE UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND FUNDING ANTI-FRAUD ENFORCEMENT 7
(2009), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ba69538b-ed12-4412-a08d
-e4ed5aaca676/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0d373005-e71d-4f4c-a59d-bc0ab830
c07e/Fraud%20Enforcement.pdf.
8
Qui tam whistleblowers are also referred to as “relators.” Id. at 3.
9
See id. at 7.
10
Id.
11
Section 4 provides:
If the Government elects to intervene and proceed with an action brought
under 3730(b), the Government may file its own complaint or amend
the complaint of a person who has brought an action under section
3730(b) to clarify or add detail to the claims in which the Government
is intervening and to add any additional claims with respect to which
the Government contends it is entitled to relief. For statute of limitations
purposes, any such Government pleading shall relate back to the filing
date of the complaint of the person who originally brought the action,
to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct,
transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the
prior complaint of that person.
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4(b)(3) (emphasis added).
12
JONES DAY, supra note 7, at 7.
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necessary as part of any false claims act investigation.”13 The effect of this provision
is to give sensitive information to non-government plaintiffs who could potentially
abuse the information by supplementing originally speculative claims, avoiding a dismissal of what would have been a legally insufficient claim.14
FERA’s amendments to the FCA not only increase government oversight and investigative ability, they also bring to the forefront concerns regarding the constitutionality of the amendments and their effect on sections of the FCA, which have already
been regarded as constitutionally dubious.15 While there are potential separation of
powers, standing, and Appointments Clause issues that could be addressed in great
detail, this Note primarily examines the treatment of a defendant’s due process rights
under the FCA and the effect of FERA’s amendments on these rights.
Part I of this Note gives a general overview of the FCA and the qui tam filing
process. Part II covers previous judicial discussion of the due process clause in the qui
tam context. Part III discusses how the lack of notice under the FCA fails to qualify
as a due process violation. Part IV contends that FERA exacerbates the lack of notice
problem enough to create due process violations. Part V argues that, although the
government would have prevailed in a due process contest with the defendant under
the old FCA, FERA’s procedural and substantive liability amendments to the FCA
strip the defendant of procedural safeguards, resulting in a violation of his right to
due process.
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act was initially passed in 1863 to address cases of entrenched
fraud that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was reluctant to prosecute.16 Prior to
FERA, the most recent significant amendments to the FCA occurred in 1986.17 The
amendments were intended to address heightened concerns about fraud in government
13

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4(c)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
JONES DAY, supra note 7, at 7.
15
Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment, Missing the Analytical Boat: The Unconstitutionality
of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 319 (1990) (discussing
the problem of standing concerning qui tam plaintiffs and finding that, because a qui tam
plaintiff has no injury in fact in a FCA suit, the qui tam provisions of the Act are unconstitutional under Article III’s requirements of cases and controversies); Frank LaSalle, Comment,
The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite
for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502–3 (1995) (arguing that, because the FCA tramples
the defendant’s due process rights, the burden of proof requirement should be heightened to
“clear and convincing” evidence to protect defendants’ rights); see also United States v. Baylor
Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (“By design, the seal provision of [FCA]
deprived the defendant . . . of the notice usually given by a complaint.”)
16
See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000).
17
False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153.
14
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contracting.18 Indeed, by the time Congress enacted the 1986 amendments, “it was
suspected that the amount of public funds being lost” to fraud ranged from hundreds
of millions to billions of dollars annually.19 The 1986 amendments provided the
anti-fraud statute which laid out the qui tam whistleblower process in effect before
FERA’s changes.
The qui tam whistleblower provisions of the FCA permit a private citizen to report
misconduct that perpetuates a fraud on the government by bringing an action on behalf
of the government against a defendant (either an individual or an entity) who the whistleblower believes has defrauded the government.20 In exchange, the whistleblower
may receive a portion of the funds recovered by the government in a successful suit.21
A whistleblower must file a suit within a certain period under the FCA: the complaint
must be filed by the relator either within six years of the violation’s occurrence, or
within three years of when DOJ discovers material facts.22 Significantly, the FCA
forbids the government and the relator from bringing an action “more than ten years
after the date” of an alleged fraudulent act.23
Once the relator decides to bring a claim, he initiates a suit by filing a complaint
with a federal district court and sending a copy of the complaint to the DOJ.24 The
complaint is served on the government, not on the defendant.25 This complaint is filed
in camera, and must be kept under seal by the court for at least sixty days.26 The
DOJ may, “for good cause shown,” move the court for an extension of the sixty-day
18

See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266–67;
SECTION OF PUB. CONTRACT LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, QUI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE
CLAIM ACT 2 (Howard W. Cox & Peter W. Hutt, II, eds., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter ABA, QUI
TAM LITIGATION].
19
LaSalle, supra note 15, at 498.
20
Beck, supra note 16, at 541.
21
Id.
22
31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (2006). The section provides:
A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought—(1) more than
6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or (2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to
the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by
the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the
circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which
the violation is committed, whichever occurs last.
Id.
23
Id. § 3731(b)(2).
24
Id. § 3730(b)(1) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for
the person and for the United States Government.”); Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional
Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 391 (2001).
25
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government . . . .”).
26
Id.

2011]

FINDING EQUILIBRIUM

1065

examination period and may move for as many extensions as necessary to complete
the investigation.27 Although the legislative history suggests that Congress did not
intend that these extensions be granted liberally, that is often the case.28
While the complaint is under seal, the Attorney General must investigate the
relator’s claim and decide whether or not to intervene in the suit and pursue an action
against the defendant.29 If the Attorney General decides to intervene, the government
assumes full responsibility for prosecuting the action.30 For his diligence in bringing
the potential fraud to the government’s attention, the relator may continue as a party
and receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the damages, plus reasonable
attorneys’ fees.31
If the government elects not to pursue the claim, the relator can still pursue the
action and receive up to thirty percent of the damages, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees,
with the caveat that if the government later decides to intervene, it may do so upon a
showing of good cause.32 Further, regardless of whether or not the government elects
to intervene in the case, the relator will receive a portion of any settlement reached
with the defendant.33
After sixty days, either the Government will file a complaint in intervention and
take primary responsibility for the suit, or the relator may independently continue with
27

Id.§ 3730(b)(3) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal . . . .”).
28
See, for example, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5289–90, stating:
By providing for sealed complaints, the Committee does not intend to
affect defendants’ rights in any way . . . The Committee feels that with
the vast majority of cases, 60 days is an adequate amount of time to
allow Government coordination, review and decision. Consequently,
“good cause” [as required for an extension] would not be established
merely upon a showing that the Government was overburdened and had
not had a chance to address the complaint.
29
31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (“The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation under
section 3729. If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating section
3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section against the person.”).
30
Id. § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing
the action. Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action . . . .”).
31
Id. § 3730(d)(1) (assuming that the government continues with the action, the relator
can expect “at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds” and “reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs”).
32
Id. § 3730(c)(3) (“When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the
status and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Government
to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.”).
33
Id. § 3730(d)(2) (“If the Government does not proceed with an action under this section . . .” the plaintiff shall receive “not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of
the proceeds . . . . Such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which
the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”).
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the suit if the government chooses not to intervene.34 Either way, at this point, the defendant is finally served with the complaint.35 During the sixty day period while the
government conducts one-sided discovery against the defendant by subpoenaing records and gathering information, the defendant may not question why the government
is doing so, since he has not yet received notice of the suit.36 “[T]he government can
also conduct extensive pre-trial motions practice” which “would otherwise be subject
to the defendant’s responsive pleadings.”37 Even after FERA, there is no statutory cap
on the number of extensions the government may seek.
II. QUI TAM SUITS AND THE COURTS
Prior to FERA’s passage, courts occasionally considered questions raised by defendants concerning the failure of the FCA’s qui tam whistleblower process to protect
defendants’ procedural due process rights. There have been three primary arguments
raised which address this concern. First, if the government can relate its complaint in
intervention back to the relator’s initial complaint, this deprives defendants of notice
of the suit.38 Second, defendants are not given notice of the relator’s complaint for at
least sixty days after the complaint has been filed because it is under seal.39 Third, because the relator stands to recover money from the suit, some defendants have contended that the relator, acting as a kind of prosecutor, has a conflict of interest in the
case, which sacrifices the integrity of the process to the detriment of the defendant.40
A. Relation Back of the Government’s Complaint in Intervention
Before FERA, courts debated whether the Government’s complaint in intervention
could relate back to the qui tam whistleblower’s complaint and remain consistent with
due process.41 For example, in United States v. Baylor University Medical Center, the
34

Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct
the action.”).
35
Id. § 3730(b)(2). The defendant has twenty days following service to respond to the
complaint. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
36
Keith D. Barber et al., Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in
False Claims Act Litigation, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 131, 139–40 (2004).
37
Id. at 139.
38
Kimberly A. Lucia, Note, United States v. Baylor University Medical Center: Impact
of FRCP 15(c)(2) on the False Claims Act’s Seal Provision, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 260
(2008).
39
31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)(2) (“The complaint . . . shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,
and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”).
40
Beck, supra note 16, at 608–09.
41
United States ex rel. Deering v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 601 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375 (D.
Mass. 2009) (“It is an open question, however, whether the concept of relation back applies to
sealed qui tam actions at all.”).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Government’s action under
the FCA commenced for statute of limitations purposes on the date it filed its complaint
in intervention, or whether the Government’s complaint in intervention related back
to the date the relator filed his complaint.42
In Baylor, the relator filed a complaint “against 132 hospitals from 30 states,”
alleging “that the [h]ospitals had defrauded Medicare by seeking and obtaining reimbursement for hospital services provided to patients participating in clinical trials
involving investigational cardiac devices.”43 Upon receiving the complaint, “the
Government had an initial sixty days to investigate,” which it subsequently renewed
sixteen times over the next eight years.44 The defendant hospitals argued that the
Government’s claims were time-barred because they were brought after the applicable
FCA statute of limitations period.45 The Government subsequently “argue[d] that its
claims [were] not time-barred because they relate back to the original complaint pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).”46 The Baylor court found that “the secrecy required
by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) is incompatible with Rule 15(c)(2), because (as is well settled)
the touchstone for relation back pursuant to Rule 15(c)(2) is notice,” and because of
the sixty-day seal provision, the defendant had not received notice at the time the
Government filed its complaint in intervention.47
Other courts considering the same question have ruled against the decision in
Baylor. For example, in United States ex rel. Serrano v. Oaks Diagnostics, Inc., a former employee sued Oaks Diagnostics Advanced Radiology of Beverly Hills, alleging
that the clinic performed unnecessary diagnostic testing on patients, and submitted
claims to Medicare for these tests, and received reimbursement.48 After the initial sixty
42

United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr, 469 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 265.
44
Id. at 266.
45
Id. at 267.
46
Id. at 268. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provide:
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when . . . the United States or a United States officer or agency
is added as a defendant by amendment, the notice requirements of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(i) and (ii) are satisfied if, during the stated period, process
was delivered or mailed to the United States attorney or the United States
attorney’s designee, to the Attorney General of the United States, or to
the officer or agency.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
47
Baylor, 469 F.3d at 270 (finding the key inquiry to be “whether the original pleading
gave a party adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence that forms the basis of
the claim or defense . . .” and that “amendments that do no more than restate the original claim
with greater particularity or amplify the details of the transaction alleged in the preceding
pleading fall within Rule 15(c)” (quoting 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 2007))).
48
United States ex rel. Serrano v. Oaks Diagnostics, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1137–38
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
43
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day seal period, the Government was granted five extensions of the period, for a total
of 300 days before it finally intervened in the case.49 “Five years after the original
complaint, the Government filed the . . . Complaint in Intervention.”50 But not only
did the complaint allege that the defendant violated the FCA, it also tacked-on common
law claims that the relator had not included in his complaint.51
Distinguishing the case from Baylor, the court analyzed the relation back principle
under Rule 15(c)(1), which states that “an amendment to a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading.”52 Based on this language, the court concluded that,
because the relator stood “in the position of the Government until the Government
decided whether” or not to intervene, the Government’s complaint in intervention and
its amendments to the original claim related back to the original complaint.53 Further,
the court noted that, even if notice was required by Rule 15, the defendants should have
been aware “of the potential suit in light of the criminal investigation and prosecution
of Advanced Radiology employees for involvement in this alleged scheme.”54
In some sense, FERA effectively ended this debate over the relation back of government complaints in intervention by siding against Baylor and codifying that the
government’s complaint in intervention, and any amendments it makes to the relator’s
original complaint, relate back to the original complaint as long as the amendments
“[arise] out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.”55 However, the act of codifying this principle does not necessarily make it constitutionally sound. Indeed, a careful analysis reveals that it essentially tramples a
defendant’s procedural due process rights.
B. Renewal of Sixty Day Extension Periods
That the government can continually renew the seal period of the complaint without notice to defendants is a troubling proposition. Courts have struggled with the
fairness of this provision and have questioned whether unlimited permission to renew
the seal period is a violation of due process.56 In United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker
49

See id. at 1138.
Id.
51
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Id. at 1139 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B)).
53
Id. at 1141.
54
Id. at 1142.
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
56
See United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care, Inc. v. Dey (In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig.), 498 F. Supp.2d 389, 399 (D. Mass. 2007) (“[I] some circumstances
egregious delay may be sufficiently prejudicial to trigger due process violations, this record
is insufficient to address any constitutional concerns.”).
50
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& Taylor, Inc., the relator charged the defendant booksellers with “fraudulently overcharging . . . federally-funded libraries.”57 The Government renewed the seal period
three times before “the court issued an order to show cause why the seal . . . should
not be lifted in its entirety and the complaint served upon the defendant.”58 The court
lifted the seal, reasoning that:
There is nothing in the statute or legislative history to suggest
that, in evaluating requests for such extensions, the court should
disregard the interests of the defendant and the public. Defendants
have a legitimate interest in building their defense while the evidence is still fresh. The public has a right to monitor the activities
of government agencies and the courts.59
Other courts have similarly noted the defendant’s right to prepare an adequate defense
and the potential for Government abuse of the seal extensions, especially considering
the statute’s failure to define what “good faith” means for the purposes of an extension.
Indeed, the court in Dey discussed that the Government’s extension of the seal period
for nearly a decade was worrisome, and that “these long delays are quite troubling . . .
[because] evidence spoils, memories fade, and prejudice may result.”60 Similarly, in
United States v. St. Joseph’s Regional Health Center, the court frowned upon the
multiple extensions awarded to the Government, which appeared “to have no other
justification than to allow the government to investigate and settle the multiple claims
at its own pace” while keeping defendants in limbo.61
In addition, in United States ex rel. Sarmont v. Target, the Government asked for
fifteen extensions of the seal period over the course of seven years, claiming that because the defendant was facing both criminal charges and separate civil charges under
the FCA, “the Government needed more time to complete its criminal investigation
before electing whether to intervene in the civil action.”62 The defendant claimed that
57

United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1189–90.
60
Dey, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 399, n.6; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark,
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 668, 703 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that Congress did not envision
investigations lasting for multiple years by continual extensions of the seal period and noting
that “the government should not . . . be allowed to unnecessarily delay lifting the seal from the
civil complaint or processing the qui tam litigation”); United States ex rel. Franklin v. ParkeDavis, No. 96-11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (declining to
consider “persuasive” government brief because government was “still not a party”).
61
United States v. St. Joseph’s Reg’l Health Ctr., 240 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (W.D. Ark.
2002).
62
United States ex rel. Sarmont v. Target, No. 02 C 0815, 2003 WL 22389119, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2003).
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the long delay was prejudicial, resulting in a due process violation.63 The court found
that, in this case, the delay did not result in a due process violation because the statute
of limitations had not yet run.64 Although the court found that the defendant was not
sufficiently prejudiced as to violate due process because the defendant did not adequately prove that the prejudice was “specific, concrete, and supported by evidence,”
the court left the door open to find a due process violation in similar situations.65
Indeed, the court noted that the “defendant’s objections to being haled into court
almost a decade after filing of the complaint d[id] not fall upon deaf ears.”66 Given
a better showing of prejudice, the court suggested, the defendant could have had a reasonable claim.
C. Conflict of Interest
Courts have occasionally considered relator actions in the light of conflict of
interest. Indeed, defendants have argued that because whistleblowers have a financial
stake in the outcome of the case, and yet are essentially prosecutors because they stand
in the shoes of the government, their procedural due process rights are infected with
bias.67 Further, “the pursuit of substantively or procedurally defective FCA claims is
an objective manifestation of the informer’s conflict of interest.”68
In United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., a former employee of Boeing “filed a
complaint under seal alleging that Boeing” violated the FCA by “improperly charg[ing]
to the government certain facilities lease costs . . . related to its work as a subcontractor
on the Government’s B-2 Bomber and Advanced Tactical Fighter programs.”69 After
Kelly served his complaint on the Government, the Government continually renewed
the seal period and investigated the allegations for over three years before deciding not
to intervene in the case.70 The court subsequently unsealed the case, and the relator
proceeded as a private party, while Boeing claimed that the FCA qui tam process was
unconstitutional.71
63

Id. at *3.
Id. at *7. See United States v. Davis, 231 F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“[I]f
courts could conclude that a mere temporal delay were enough to give rise to a deprivation of
due process even where the statutory period of limitations had not run, it would be tantamount
to a judicial override of legislative prerogative.”).
65
Sarmont, 2003 WL 22389119 at *7 (quoting United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450
(7th Cir. 1994)).
66
Id.
67
See Beck, supra note 16, at 623.
68
Id. at 624.
69
United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1140 (1994).
70
Id.
71
Id.
64
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Specifically, Boeing contended “that the FCA violate[d] Boeing’s right not to be
deprived of property without due process because it permitted financially interested relators to prosecute the company on behalf of the government.”72 The FCA’s “promise
of a reward to relators for successful prosecution creates a conflict of interest between
[the] relator’s desire for pecuniary gain and duty as a prosecutor performing ‘government functions’ to seek a just and fair result.”73 Further, Boeing contended that, “[b]ecause the government is the real party in interest,” and the relator just stands in the
shoes of the Government, “a relator ‘must place justice above competing objectives.’”74
Holding for the Government, the court found that, because the “qui tam action is
taken on behalf of both the government and the relator, . . . the two share a single interest in successful litigation;” and thus, the court concluded that there was no conflict
of interest.75 Moreover, the court found that “the fact that relators sue in the name of
the United States does not mean that they wield governmental powers and therefore
owe the same type of duty to serve the public interest as government prosecutors.”76
Other courts, however, have suggested that a conflict of interest on the part of one
bringing the suit for the government who also benefits financially may result in a due
process violation. By analogy, in Marshall v. Jerrico, the plaintiff brought an action
“challenging the civil penalty provisions of the [Fair Labor Standards] Act.”77 The
issue concerned whether § 16(e) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides that
“sums collected as civil penalties for the unlawful employment of child labor are returned to the Employment Standards Administration of the Department of Labor in
reimbursement for the costs of determining violations and assessing penalties,”78 violated the Due Process Clause by “creat[ing] an impermissible risk of bias on the part
of the assistant regional administrator.”79 Bias must be considered as a possibility
because, under the FLSA, “a regional office’s greater effort in uncovering violations
could lead to an increased amount of penalties and a greater share of reimbursements
for that office.”80
Although the Court found that there was not a due process violation because the
biasing influence was “too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints applicable to the decisions of an administrator performing prosecutorial functions,” it also suggested that a bias could arise and violate defendant’s procedural due
process rights.81 Indeed, the Court stated: “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest,
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 10, Boeing, 9 F.3d 743 (No. 92-36660)).
Id. at 760.
Id.
Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 241 (1980).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 243–44.
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financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions.”82 Thus, while in this particular situation, the bias was too remote to seriously impact due process, where a relator who directly stands in the shoes
of the Government for purposes of prosecuting the defendant, the Court may have
found a connection concrete enough to result in a violation of due process.
Moreover, the Court noted that it decided against the defendant in part because
“[n]o governmental official stands to profit economically from vigorous enforcement
of the child labor provisions of the Act.”83 But, in the context of a qui tam suit, it is
undisputed that a relator stands to benefit greatly from the successful enforcement of
the FCA because he is guaranteed some form of monetary reward for even bringing
the suit. This guarantee is, in fact, written into the statute.84
III. DETERMINING A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person
shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”85 Courts
have interpreted the Due Process Clause as having both a substantive and procedural
component.86 The relevant due process question pertaining to the qui tam provisions
of the FCA and FERA, however, specifically raises procedural due process concerns.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit noted:
The “touchstone” of procedural due process is [the] protection
of the individual against the arbitrary action[s] of the government.
The goal of procedural due process analysis is to determine whether
[the government] has provided adequate procedures to minimize
efficiently the risk of arbitrary or erroneous deprivations of life,
liberty, or property. In pursuing this goal, however, courts must
also take into account society’s interest in the efficient administration of government.87
82

Id. at 249–50; see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 789
(1987) (holding that, while courts generally “may appoint private attorneys to prosecute criminal contempt” charges, “the District Court erred in appointing . . . attorneys” who were counsel
for an interested party in the underlying litigation). Justice Blackmun concluded that this error
amounted to a due process violation. Id. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[Due process]
requires a disinterested prosecutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public, rather than
a private client, and to seek justice that is unfettered”).
83
Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 250.
84
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (2006).
85
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1975).
87
Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted).
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In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court devised a three-part test for determining the amount
of process to be administered in a given situation:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.88
The first question, then, is whether a defendant in a qui tam suit under the FCA
is deprived of a life, property, or liberty interest when his suit, for which he has no
notice, either drags on for years through renewal of the sixty day extension periods,
or plaintiff’s conflict of interest interferes with his process.89 Conviction of an offense
under the FCA results in treble damages, and civil monetary penalties for each false
claim made to the government can be as great as $11,000 each.90 Courts have held
these provisions “to be punitive and are subject to an Eighth Amendment review.”91
Clearly, paying a penalty under the FCA results in a deprivation of property in that the
defendant is forced to pay a large fine. “Courts have consistently held that people retain a property interest in the money they possess.”92 Further, not only will defendants
be deprived of money through damages, they will also be deprived of property through
payment of attorneys’ fees and lost time. The issue of lost time is crucial because,
without notice, defendants inevitably spend a sizeable amount of time, if they are even
aware of the suit, trying to ascertain what the suit is about. Even if the case never
comes to trial, instead of paying penalties, defendants may be forced to settle in order
to keep costs down.93
88

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act:
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal
Period, 83 N.D. L. REV. 837, 839 (2007).
90
Kevin M. Comeau, False Certification Claims in Light of Allison Engine and False
Claims Act Amendments Introduced in the 111th Congress, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 491, 512 (2009).
91
Id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103–05 (1997) (“The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines . . . .”).
92
LaSalle, supra note 15, at 521 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72
(1972) (“The Court has also made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due
process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”)).
93
Fabrikant & Nwabuzor, supra note 89, at 838–39 (“[U]nduly prolong[ing] the seal
period . . . enhance[s] the ability of the government and relator’s counsel, often acting in
consort, to extract unreasonable settlements from defendants.”); see also Beck, supra note 16,
at 625 (“[C]ases can prove to have a nuisance value, causing the defendant to settle to avoid the
higher costs of defending a fraud claim.”).
89
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A. The Private Interest
The first prong of the Mathews Test considers the weight of the private party’s
interest at stake. Defendants in FCA actions have a great interest in receiving adequate
process. The interest of defendants should be viewed taking into consideration the fact
that the seal period, during which the government conducts one-sided discovery against
the defendant, is often extended for years.94 Defendants have an interest in ensuring
that they do not waste time and money solving a mystery as to what suit they are
fighting or spending time running around in needless circles trying to decipher the
contents of a plaintiff’s claim. Often these claims turn out to be completely without
merit, are only filed with the relators’ monetary interests in mind, and potentially drag
on for years at the expense of defendant’s time, money, and peace of mind.95
Additionally, defendants have an interest in protecting their reputations. As Frank
LaSalle notes in his article, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened
Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, “[f]raud allegations are taken very
seriously by the courts,” and can be severely detrimental for a defendant’s business
reputation.96 This is especially true where the plaintiff’s complaint is under seal for
an extended period of time, and the only real information the general public has about
the complaint is in the form of vague whispering and rumors, often based on meritless
accusations. Defendants should not have to risk business ruin because of false accusations and costly guesswork as to what claim to prepare for in potential litigation.
B. Current Procedures and Feasible Alternatives
The second prong of the Mathews Test requires an analysis of the current procedures in place and asks whether there are any feasible alternatives to these procedures.97
Currently, as discussed above, the FCA provides for liberal sanctions and high damages
in the event of conviction, so that it is necessary for procedural protections to be implemented to safeguard defendants’ due process rights.98 The current procedure allowing
the government to continually renew the sixty day extension periods is important in
94

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
Beck, supra note 16, at 623–25.
96
LaSalle, supra note 15, at 525.
97
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975).
98
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1839–40 (1992) (“[L]abeling more-than-compensatory money
sanctions punitive rather than deterrent would require the increased use of procedural protections. By calling the sanctions deterrent, compensatory, or simply debt collection devices, the
Court has avoided developing procedural protections for settings in which punitive sanctions
were imposed. . . . Abandoning the conventional paradigms would require the development
of middleground procedure, specifically designed to respond to the punitiveness of middleground sanctions.”).
95
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that the government is given more time to investigate the relator’s suit and prepare to
file charges against a defendant.99 However, it is also possible that this same procedure would be equally as effective if the courts played a more active role in checking
the Government’s ability to continually renew the sixty day seal periods. Indeed,
currently the only check on the Government’s ability to renew is that its request for
renewal must be for good cause.100 Instead of using this provision as a check, courts
often grant these extensions liberally.101
With regard to the relator’s conflict of interest, the current procedure, which allows
relators to file suit in the name of the Government, is effective in increasing the number of prosecutions against those who have submitted false claims for payment to the
Government.102 The procedure encouraging relators to file suit is less of an issue than
the lack of checks on their ability to do so, and the potential that their wide latitude
in filing and conducting their cases may result in widespread abuse of the process at
the expense of defendants.103 Further, the FCA put limited procedures (now expanded
by FERA) in place to protect relators from retaliatory actions taken by their employers,
such as demotion and firing.104 This means they have every incentive to file a suit,
whether or not it is valid. Advocates of the whistleblower scheme argue that defendants
are protected because, if the whistleblower’s complaint is frivolous, the Government
will most likely decline to intervene.
C. The Government Interest
The third and final prong of the Mathews test considers the Government’s interest
in the current procedure.105 The Government does have several key interests in the procedures as they currently exist. The sixty day seal period during which the defendant
has no notice of the suit, and the potential extensions of the seal period are key for
99

S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289; see also
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04(B) (3d ed. 2006)
(“[W]hile there are no firm limits to the length of time a case may remain under seal, extensions may not be granted groundlessly or indefinitely.”).
100
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2006).
101
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102
ABA, QUI TAM LITIGATION, supra note 18, at 2–3 (noting the three fundamental concerns that shaped qui tam enforcement procedure are: “(1) the detection of fraud, (2) the subsequent investigation of fraud, and (3) litigation hurdles that had evolved through case law
which limited the government’s ability to recover fraud losses”).
103
Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980).
104
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (stating that whistleblowers who are “discharged, demoted,
suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against” because of their
qui tam complaints are entitled to “reinstatement [at] the same seniority, . . . [two] times the
amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees”).
105
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975).
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several reasons. The Senate reports discussing the seal period noted that the provision
served an important purpose in allowing the Government to maximize its ability to investigate the allegations in the complaint by keeping the allegations hidden.106 This
way the defendant cannot be tipped off that a charge has been filed and cause interference with the Government’s investigation.107 Indeed, the seal period allows the government to “avoid compromising any pending criminal investigation.”108
Generally speaking, because the use of qui tam whistleblowers has increased the
number of qui tam suits, the seal period also serves a purpose in “allow[ing] the
government first to ascertain in private whether it was already investigating the
claims stated in the suit and then to consider whether it wishes to intervene,” based
on this information.109
Further, although it is a potential conflict of interest, allowing relators to stand in
the shoes of the Government in filing these qui tam actions serves several purposes
as well. “[P]rivate informers supplement the activities of public law enforcement personnel, thereby boosting the number of enforcement actions filed.”110 The Government
contended that because whistleblowers file more cases, they further protect the public
treasury by bringing fraudulent behavior to light.111 Indeed, in United States v. United
States ex rel. Thornton, the court stated that “it is in the public interest to protect the
federal treasury and ensure the integrity and honesty of those that receive payments
from the government.”112 However, it is also worth noting that a relator’s ability to file
106

The Senate Report for the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 states:
Keeping the qui tam complaint under seal for the initial 60-day time
period is intended to allow the Government an adequate opportunity to
fully evaluate the private enforcement suit and determine both if that
suit involves matters the Government is already investigating and whether
it is in the Government’s interest to intervene and take over the civil
action. Nothing in the statute, however, precludes the Government from
intervening before the 60-day period expires, at which time the court
would unseal the complaint and have it served upon the defendant.
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289.
107
An essential problem with this, of course, is that the point of the notice requirement is
to give a defendant a “heads up” so they can begin preparing for litigation.
108
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5266, 5281 (“In
response to Justice Department concerns that qui tam complaints filed in open court might
tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations, the subcommittee adopted a 60-day seal
provision for all qui tam complaints.”).
109
BOESE, supra note 99; see also United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington
Univ., No. 95-2000(JGP), 2007 WL 1302597 at *3 (D.D.C. 2007).
110
Beck, supra note 16, at 609.
111
United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (noting that the FCA “create[s] incentives for potential whistle blowers to
assist the government to discover fraud against the taxpayers” (quoting United States v. United
States ex rel. Thornton, 207 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 2000))).
112
United States v. United States ex rel. Thornton, 207 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 2000).
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suit in the shoes of the Government is supplementary to the Government’s ability to
proceed on its own.113 It is only if the Government cannot bring the case for some
reason that a relator should be allowed to file a suit under the FCA.114
With regard to the public interest, the Government claims that in balancing its interest against that of a defendant in a qui tam action, the Government’s role in serving
the public interest must be considered.115 However, how much the public interest has
actually been benefitted by whistleblower suits is not a settled matter. Indeed, “no
conclusive evidence shows that the qui tam provision of the FCA increases the deterrent
effect of the statute.”116 Moreover, “the qui tam provision of the FCA is not as valuable in protecting the public interest as proponents claim, since it allows relators to
receive funds that the government would otherwise earn.”117 The qui tam provision
also “allows relators to recover funds that” are unfavorable to the Government.118
D. Balancing the Prongs
Prior to the revisions to the FCA set forth in FERA, the outcome of the Mathews
balancing test would have been different than a subsequent balancing test after the
adoption of FERA. Before the amendments in FERA, the Government interest most
likely outweighed the lack of protection for a defendant’s due process rights. This is
because, while the defendant does have an interest in protecting his reputation and
while the risk of monetary damage and wasted time are legitimate and compelling
interests, the stakes are most likely not great enough to outweigh the Government interest in protecting the treasury against fraud.
Moreover, while the procedures in place do not provide a significant amount of
protection for defendants, they do provide some degree of protection. For example,
in a qui tam suit which the Government declines to join, the court may award the defendant attorneys’ fees and expenses in certain situations where the whistleblower’s
complaint lacks credibility.119 It is worth noting, however, that a court may award
113

United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]he [FCA] must be analyzed in the context of its twin goals of rejecting suits which the
government is capable of pursuing itself, while promoting those which the government is not
equipped to bring on its own.”).
114
Id.
115
United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., No. 95-2000 (JGP), 2007
WL 1302597 at *5–6 (D.D.C. May 2, 2007) (considering the government’s public policy reasons for the qui tam procedure and extension of the seal period).
116
Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 980 (2007) (capitalization omitted).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 997.
119
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4)
(2006) (“If the Government does not proceed with the action and the person bringing the action
conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees and
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damages to the defendant, but does not have to.120 In addition, the traditional hurdles
of the litigation process and the need for relators to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence protect defendants against the worst—though by no means
all—abuses.121
The Government interest in increasing the number of fraud cases prosecuted
through the use of relators and the increased investigation time provided by the sixty
day extension periods slightly outweighs the interest of defendants.122 In part, this is
because the “negative consequences for [defendants] are, at the very least, tolerable
in comparison to the strong benefits of encouraging external whistle blowing under
the qui tam provision.”123 Generally speaking, as between the party who may have
been responsible for a fraud, and one who has nothing to do with the fraud, the party
who may have perpetrated the fraud should bear the risk of the charge.
Moreover, the Government is often overloaded on cases resulting from its use of
relators. It is not unreasonable that the government may need more than sixty days
to thoroughly investigate a potential relator’s complaint. Indeed, it is in some sense
a benefit to the defendant for the complaint to remain under seal, in that it protects the
defendant’s reputation in not revealing the potential fraud to the public. Additionally,
allowing the government more time to investigate the complaint assures that if a court
removes the seal and the relator serves the complaint on the defendant, that the complaint is legitimate. However, given the potential for abuse inherent in both the allowance of sixty day seal extensions and the relators’ conflict of interest in bringing these
suits, the private interests at stake could, in certain situations, outweigh the Government interests and thus demand a set of procedures with more checks on relators and
Government behavior during the seal period.
expenses if the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person
bringing the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes
of harassment.”).
120
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Millner v. ITT Aerospace, No. 95-3545, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19091, at *14–16 (7th Cir. July 21, 1997) (awarding attorneys’ fees to defendant and
granting summary judgment because plaintiff’s claim was vexatious and frivolous); United
States ex rel. Minna Ree Winer Children’s Class Trust v. Regions Bank of La., No. 94-408,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8779 (E.D. La. June 18, 1996) (awarding attorneys’ fees “in light of the
litigious history of [the suit’s] instigators”); cf. United States ex rel. Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., 870 F. Supp. 457, 460 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying the defendant’s request for attorneys’
fees), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1213 (1996).
121
FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. NO. 345 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5296 (“The Committee believes that the appropriate burden of proof
devolving upon the United States in a civil False Claims Act suit is by a preponderance of
the evidence.”).
122
F. Paul Bland, Why ‘Qui Tam’ is Necessary, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 13, 14 (“[A]
major reason for revitalizing qui tam suits was that public prosecutors did not have the time
or resources to go after a high proportion of reported significant fraud.”).
123
Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (1997).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF FERA ON DEFENDANTS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The amendments to the FCA set forth in FERA extend the rights of relators and
the Government in FCA actions further than the existing procedures protect defendants’
due process rights. FERA leaves open procedural questions which could provide
some protection for defendants as against the extension of relators’ and Government
rights under FERA. For example, FERA does not address whether the continual extension of the seal period combined with the effective extension of the statute of limitations resulting from the government’s ability to relate its Complaint in Intervention
back to the relator’s initial complaint results in a violation of defendant’s procedural
due process rights. Moreover, FERA never addresses the question of notice and how
the defendants’ lack of notice should be treated given the changes Congress has made
to the FCA; nor does FERA address the relator’s potential conflict of interest. As a
result of the new privileges given to the Government and relators under FERA, and the
omission of guidance on key procedural issues, under a subsequent Mathews analysis,
the Government interest does not outweigh the defendants’ interest.
To reiterate, FERA includes several amendments that directly impact the whistleblower provisions of the FCA. This discussion is split into two sections, the first discussing procedural changes in FERA, and the second highlighting the other relevant
amendments.
A. Procedural Changes
There are several key procedural changes in FERA that significantly alter the
whistleblower provisions in the FCA.124 First, under FERA, the Government’s complaint in intervention relates back to the relator’s complaint for statute of limitations
purposes, even if the seal period has been extended for years and years.125 That the
Government’s complaint in intervention relates back to the relator’s initial complaint, generally speaking, would not be a problem given that the relator stands in the
shoes of the Government for standing purposes.126 However, because FERA allows
any addition of new Government claims after any amount of seal period extensions,
even if the defendant can somehow gather at the beginning what the suit is about,
without notice, he may have no idea what the suit will become or against what he must
124

JONATHAN L. DIESENHAUS ET AL., HOGAN LOVELLS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UPDATE:
NEW FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR THE KNOWING AND IMPROPER
RETENTION OF OVERPAYMENTS 2 (2009), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication
/58bb8a0a-f182-4639-86b6-31a80e4962ac/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/8d2f8f83-cb66-47ca-975c-31ef9fb163b3/GKUpdate.pdf.
125
See Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(b)(3),
123 Stat. 1617, 1623.
126
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(finding that injury to the United States suffices to confer standing on a relator).
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defend. The statute of limitations is supposed to act as a procedural protection for the
defendant as against his deprivation of notice during the seal period. But, in allowing
relation back, Congress effectively extended the statute of limitations for as long as
necessary for the Government to make its case.127
Second, at the discretion of the Government, relators now have access to all information obtained by the Government as part of the investigation of the claim, which the
Government conducts through use of Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs).128 “CIDs
are requests for documents, interrogatory responses and/or testimony to facilitate investigations of FCA violations.”129 FERA removes procedural hurdles to authorizing
use of CIDs to investigate qui tam allegations.130 In part, FERA accomplishes this
feat by allowing the Attorney General to delegate power to anyone in the DOJ to sign
CIDs for information, whereas, before only the Attorney General could sign these demands.131 As Kevin M. Comeau notes, “These amendments will upset the courts’
careful balancing of government and contractor interests and usher in a new wave of
relator-initiated litigation.”132
Because relators may have access to information obtained by the Government as
part of its investigation, even if the Government decides not to intervene in the suit, relators will have an additional advantage over the defendant because they will be able
to benefit from Government resources. Indeed, “the standard seal imposed on FCA
cases does not preclude the federal government or relator from sharing the complaint,
any other pleadings, or the written disclosure with any state or local government entity
named as a co-plaintiff.”133 Given this new provision, a hypothetical relator could continue an action as a civil suit against a defendant when the Government decides not to
intervene in the action. Whereas, before, the relator would not have had the full advantage of Government resources and the fruits of the Government investigation on which
to rely, now the relator, no longer in the shoes of the Government but instead acting
127

See JONES DAY, supra note 7, at 2 (“FERA seems to ignore the issue of notice and codifies an exception that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, treats the government’s laterfiled allegations as if they were filed when the case was initiated. This has the effect of
expanding liability for the defendant and limiting the defendant’s ability to defend itself. For
example, if a whistleblower case was filed in 2005 and not made known to the defendant until
2009, the defendant could have to defend allegations dating back to 1995, which is four years
more than the 10-year statute of limitations would allow in most other federal lawsuits.”).
128
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3733 (West 2011).
129
ALI ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
130
Id.
131
31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1) (2006) (“The Attorney General may delegate the authority to
issue civil investigative demands [CIDs] under this subsection.”); see Ali, supra note 2, at 3.
132
Comeau, supra note 90, at 492–93 (adding that “[t]he current proposals are overbroad
and will strip defendants of most of their jurisdictional defenses against relator-initiated fishing
expeditions.”).
133
Christopher C. Burris et al., Converging Events Signal a Changing Landscape in False
Claims Act and Whistle-Blower Litigation and Investigations, FED. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, 61.
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as a private party, has a plethora of additional information to use in its case against
the defendant.
That whistleblowers now receive Government information and the Attorney
General’s ability to delegate the authority to sign-off on CIDs combine to put the defendant at a severe disadvantage. Allowing other DOJ employees to sign off on CIDs
“will increase the use of CIDs which enable the Government to engage in unilateral
discovery (including interrogatories and depositions of targets and witnesses) prior to
the defendant being served with the complaint.”134
The combination of the procedural amendments results in a litigation climate which
significantly favors whistleblowers. Not only can the government now engage in onesided discovery against a defendant without the defendant’s knowledge of the fact that
either a suit has been brought or what the suit is about, the Government can now conduct more extensive discovery, some of which information may be confidential, and
can share this discovery with the relator to be used later in a private suit.135 Further, this
one-sided discovery may continue for years while the Government renews the extension
period, with any new claims the Government devises during the interim added to the
initial complaint, regardless of the defendant’s lack of notice. Significantly, these procedural amendments are applicable to cases pending on the date of enactment.136
B. Substantive Liability Changes
FERA’s procedural changes are crucial to examining a defendant’s due process
rights; however, it is necessary to examine the new substantive liability provisions
as well, to accurately determine what exactly a defendant now stands to lose under
FERA’s lesser procedural safeguards. It is worth noting that the substantive liability
provisions of FERA have expanded the reach of the FCA, by expanding the definition
of “claims” and lowering the materiality requirement.137
The first key substantive change eliminated the presentment clause, which required
that in order for liability, a person must knowingly present a claim for payment to the
134

Mark R. Troy, New Federal Fraud Law Implements Key Changes to False Claims Act,
COUNSEL’S ADVISORY (Wash. Legal Fund, Washington, D.C.), June 5, 2009, at 1, available
at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/counselsadvisory/060509Troy_CA.pdf (noting
further that “[b]ecause CIDs can be issued after a qui tam complaint has already been filed but
before it is served, this form of discovery may deprive defendants of many of the protections
afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
135
See COOK, supra note 7, at 7.
136
See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(1),
123 Stat. 1617, 1625 (requiring that relation back provisions “shall . . . apply to all claims under
the [FCA] that are pending on or after [the date of enactment].”).
137
See Burris et al., supra note 133, at 60 (“The amendments would allow FCA suits on
claims made to the federal government for money or property to which the United States does
not have title but to which the U.S. government does have control, again expanding the reach
of the FCA into largely new territory.”).
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Government.138 After FERA, the section reads, “any person who knowingly presents,
or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” deleting
the portion of the statute which required these payments to be made directly to the
Government.139 Thus, FERA establishes “liability for false and fraudulent claims submitted to government contractors and grantees ‘if the money or property is to be
spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.’”140 This expansion of liability means that anybody along the chain from subcontractor of a subcontractor, to subcontractor, to contractor, can be liable for presenting a false claim to the Government, regardless of intent. So, if a subcontractor
presents a claim to a contractor and it turns out the claim is unintentionally fraudulent,
both the subcontractor and the contractor may be liable to the Government under the
FCA and both may face treble damages.
The second key substantive change involves the substitution of a “materiality”
requirement for the requirement that one must intend to defraud the Government.141
Through these changes, Congress specifically sought to overrule the Supreme Court’s
decision on June 9, 2008, in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders.142
In Allison Engine, two shipbuilders entered into a contract with the Navy “to build
a new fleet of . . . guided missile destroyers.”143 In order to fulfill this contract, they
entered into a subcontract with Allison Engine Co. to build generator sets.144 Allison
Engine then subcontracted with General Tool Co. (GTC) and GTC subcontracted with
Southern Ohio Fabricators, Inc. (SOFCO).145 The Navy’s contract with the shipbuilders, and Allison Engine’s contract with its subcontractors required “that every
part of each destroyer be built in accordance with the Navy’s baseline drawings and
military standards.”146 Further, the subcontracts specified that each generator must be
accompanied by a certificate of conformance.147
In 1995, two former employees of GTC brought suit against Allison Engine, GTC,
and SOFCO as qui tam relators under the FCA, seeking to recover damages under
138

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) provided that any person who “knowingly makes, uses,
or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid
or approved by the government” is liable.
139
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2011), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4.
140
Burris et al., supra note 133, at 60 (quoting Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009 (FERA) § 4).
141
Compare 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2011), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)
(2006).
142
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008).
143
Id. at 665.
144
Id. at 665–66.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 666.
147
Id.
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31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (2), and (3).148 The Court granted certiorari with respect to the
latter two sections. The relators claimed that Allison Engine submitted its invoices,
as well as GTC’s and SOFCO’s invoices, to the shipbuilders for defective work which
did not conform to the “baseline drawings and military standards.”149 The relators,
however, could not show that the shipbuilders had ever submitted the subcontractors’
invoices to the Navy, nor did they show any evidence of any invoices that the shipbuilders had submitted to the Navy.150
With regard to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2), the Court held that “a person must have
the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim ‘paid or approved by the Government’” to be held liable under this section.151 Next, the Court discussed 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(3), finding “that a conspiracy to defraud a federally funded private entity does
not constitute a ‘conspiracy to defraud the United States.’”152
In explaining the reason for its unanimous holdings, the Court noted that without
the element of specific intent to defraud the Government, the reach of 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(2) liability would be “almost boundless.”153 Further, the Court explained
that in interpreting the statute in this manner, it intended to “giv[e] effect to Congress’
efforts to protect the Government from loss due to fraud but also ensures that ‘a defendant is not answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary and reasonable consequences of his conduct.’”154 FERA deletes the former (a)(2) and adds a new section,
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(B), which provides that any person who “knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
148

Prior to FERA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006) provided in part that:
Any person who—
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; [or]
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid . . . .
149
Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 666.
150
Id. at 667.
151
Id. at 668–69 (finding that “[e]liminating this element of intent, as the Court of Appeals
did, would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating ‘fraud against the
Government.’” (internal citation omitted)).
152
Id. at 673.
153
Id. at 669 (quoting United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496
(D.C. Cir. 2004)); Gerald E. Wimberly et al., The Presentment Requirement Under the False
Claims Act: The Impact of Allison Engine & the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, 9 BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 5 (2009).
154
Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 672 (quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470
(2006)).
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fraudulent claim” is liable.155 This new provision means that the basis for the intent
requirement—that a person must intend for the Government itself to pay the claim for
liability to attach—has been eliminated.156 Now, with the inclusion of the word “material” in the provision, the Government or relator must show only that the false claim
or statement had “a natural tendency to influence” or was “capable of influencing” the
payment of the claim.157
When read in combination with the new definition of “claim,” which now encompasses “money or property . . . spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance
a Government program or interest,”158 it seems evident that FERA seeks to expand
liability by establishing clear liability for false or fraudulent claims submitted to government contractors and grantees, and not just to claims made directly to the Government.159 Thus, FERA ignores the Supreme Court’s concerns from Allison Engine,
nearly guaranteeing that subcontractors will be answerable for more than “the ordinary
and reasonable consequences of [their] conduct.”160
Crucially, FERA’s revisions to the FCA’s substantive liability provisions apply
prospectively to “conduct on or after the date of enactment [May 20, 2009],” with two
exceptions.161 First, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (substituting the materiality requirement for the intent requirement), applies retroactively as if the provision had been
enacted on June 7, 2008, two days prior to the decision in Allison Engine, to “all claims
under the False Claims Act . . . that [were] pending on or after that date.”162 This application essentially negates the Allison Engine decision and has prompted discussion
over whether it violates the Ex Post Facto and Due Process clauses of the Constitution.163 Second, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3731(b), 3733, and 3732 of the FCA, which govern the
ability of the United States to intervene in qui tam actions, the Government’s power
to conduct investigations, and the jurisdiction of the FCA, apply to any case pending
on the date of enactment.164
155

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(1),
123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (emphasis added).
156
Wimberly et al., supra note 153, at 7.
157
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4) (West 2011) (defining “material” as “having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”).
158
Id.§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
159
See Burris et al., supra note 133, at 60 (explaining that in passing FERA, “Congress . . .
sought to overturn the . . . ruling in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corporation that
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) requires that a false claim be presented directly to the federal government, as opposed to a government grantee” (internal citation omitted)).
160
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008) (quoting
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006)).
161
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f), 123
Stat. 1617, 1625.
162
Id. (internal citation omitted).
163
Wimberly et al., supra note 153, at 9.
164
See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4.
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V. MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE ANALYSIS AFTER FERA
Cases that have previously held that the lack of protective procedures used in qui
tam actions did not rise to the level of a due process violation will have to reconsider
the issue with both FERA’s substantive liability and procedural amendments in mind.
For example, the court in Dey found that the Government’s continual extensions of the
seal period were “worrisome” and caused due process “concerns,” but did not result
in a violation.165 When considered in light of FERA’s allowance of the relation back
of Government complaints in intervention, increased rights of relators and ease of
filing a qui tam complaint, due process concerns become more than worrisome.
A. Defendant’s Interest
The substantive provisions of FERA no longer require intent but only that the fraud
be material to the claim for payment.166 Defendant’s interest in having notice of the
suit is significantly affected in that his liability is now much more expansive than before, to include not only active fraud, but also any fraud that may possibly have influenced a claim for payment.167 That is, even if a contractor did not personally commit
the fraud, he may be responsible for the actions of his subcontractors who may have
committed an action which could be considered capable of influencing a claim. The
problem is that the whole scheme at times makes a contractor responsible for actions
once, twice, or three times removed from his conduct; and, without adequate notice, the
defendant cannot possibly expect to adequately defend against such attenuated claims.
At least under the old FCA, when a whistleblower filed an action against a contractor
for defrauding the Government, the contractor probably had some idea what the suit
was about, because the act required intent.168 Now, the contractor does not even have
to make a claim to the Government itself, but instead to grantees. This makes the connection between a fraudulent claim and the Government increasingly tenuous.169
B. Procedures in Place
The procedures in place to protect defendants’ rights have become virtually nonexistent after FERA. Even as the Court in Allison Engine cautioned against the potential for boundless liability,170 FERA extended liability to an extreme, without providing
165

United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care, Inc. v. Dey (In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig.), 498 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399 (D. Mass. 2007).
166
See Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4.
167
See DIESENHAUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 1.
168
See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671 (2008).
169
See Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,
86 IND. L.J. 257, 265–66 (2011).
170
Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 669.
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new ways to protect defendants’ right to notice and defense; and, indeed, without even
acknowledging the lack of procedural protection or increased liability. Further, the
treble damages provisions and punitive nature of the FCA have not been adjusted
in FERA to take into account the new expansive liability for potentially lesser cases
of fraud.
Consider the Government’s ability to renew the seal period continually. FERA
now allows all Government complaints and added claims to relate back to the initial
relator’s complaint regardless of the statute of limitations.171 The Court in United States
v. Davis declined to find a violation of defendant’s due process rights because the
statute of limitations had not run;172 but now, Congress has essentially decided that for
purposes of qui tam actions, the statute of limitations may be disregarded. This change
suggests that courts may be more willing to find that procedure does not adequately
protect defendants’ rights.
Further, prior to FERA, commentators argued that a relator’s “stand[ing] in the
shoes of the Government” for standing purposes created a potential violation of defendants’ due process rights because relators earned a reward for successful prosecution
of defendants.173 This “create[d] a conflict of interest between [the] relator’s desire for
pecuniary gain and duty . . . [of] seek[ing] a just and fair result” in performing government functions.174 However, FERA potentially increases a relator’s bias by giving him
more of an incentive to file the suit to make his own personal lawsuit against the defendant more fruitful. Indeed, a relator now has access to all information obtained as
part of the Government’s investigation; so, even if the Government does not pursue
the claim, the relator, acting as a private party, can continue the suit, with the advantage of knowing all the information gained in Government discovery efforts.175 This
increased incentive serves to heighten the number of “impermissible factors [brought]
into the prosecutorial decision,” thereby increasing the bias and raising “serious constitutional questions.”176
Moreover, FERA increased the protections for whistleblowers filing suit by expanding a whistleblower’s ability to sue for employer retaliation.177 FERA also expanded the right of action to government contractors or agents, in addition to employees
of contractors, who make an effort to stop an FCA violation, regardless of whether the
171

Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(b)(3), 123
Stat. 1617, 1623.
172
Davis, 231 F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
173
See Daniel C. Lumm, Comment, The 2009 “Clarifications” to the False Claims Act of
1863: The All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 527, 538 (2010). But see United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 759 (9th
Cir. 1993).
174
Boeing, 9 F.3d at 759; Lumm, supra note 173, at 538.
175
See COOK, supra note 7, at 7.
176
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50.
177
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(d), 123
Stat. 1617, 1625.
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underlying efforts were made in furtherance of an FCA action.178 Whistleblowers now
not only have access to more government information and the potential for reward,
thanks to procedural protections, they no longer have to worry about retaliation. So,
why not file a complaint, frivolous or not, when there are really no ramifications for
doing so? The way FERA has amended the statute basically ensures that whistleblowers may get something out of a suit, because the defendant may end up settling
for the sake of its reputation. It is worth noting that, while FERA increased procedural
protections for whistleblowers, it did not add new provisions with protections for defendants, or even mention their lack of notice.179
C. Government Interest
The Government interest is essentially the same as before. To recap: the Government has an interest in increasing accountability for perpetrating fraud on the Government and protecting the federal treasury.180 Further, with the increased number of
whistleblowers coming forward, the function of the seal periods, to give the Government time to investigate, still serves an important purpose.181 In one respect, the increased number of whistleblower suits anticipated after the passage of FERA heightens
the Government’s interest in having extra time to investigate.
D. Balancing the Prongs
FERA’s passage augments the defendant’s interest, and adds procedures that increase the power of whistleblowers, while simultaneously stripping defendants of the
statute of limitations in some cases and failing to address pre-existing procedural defects.182 These defects threaten to upset what little balance between defendants and
the Government previously existed.183 Whereas before, the Government’s claim that
these provisions and any defects in defendants’ due process was a reasonable price
to pay in the public interest,184 the weight on the scales has shifted. Indeed, in a recent case the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged the whistleblower
178

See Edward J. Kinberg, The Impact of Federal, State, and Local False Claims Acts on
the Construction Industry, FLA. BAR. J., Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 48, 49; COOLEY GODWARD
KRONISH, LLP, FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT EXPANDS THE FALSE CLAIMS
ACT 2 (2009), http://www.cooley.info/files/64949_ALERT_FERAandFCA.pdf.
179
See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4.
180
Supra Part III.C.
181
See BOESE, supra note 99, at § 4(B).
182
FERA gives no guidance as to how defendants’ right to notice should be addressed under
these new provisions; nor does FERA say anything about the renewal of the seal period or the
relator’s potential conflict of interest. See generally Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009 (FERA) § 4.
183
Comeau, supra note 90, at 492–93.
184
See Hamer, supra note 123, at 101.

1088

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1061

provisions in FERA, claiming that they “violated the public’s First Amendment right
of access to information.”185 Considering that the Government tends to cite the public
interest as one of the reasons for having these provisions, this kind of claim dilutes the
Government’s arguments for the seal period as a means of protecting the public.
Further, more whistleblowers will file actions because of the ease of filing and
enhanced protections, which may be a reason to keep the seal periods so that the Government has more time to investigate a heavier load. However, the more cases DOJ
must sift through, the more likely it is to increase the number of times it extends the
seal period without giving notice to defendants. Thus, abuse of the seal period will
become a more rampant problem. Because FERA also strips defendants of the protection of the statute of limitations when the Government continually renews the seal
period, defendants cannot even rely on that procedural protection. The increase in
whistleblower suits, then, tends to hurt defendants more than it helps the Government.
A court may still award a defendant attorneys’ fees and damages if the whistleblower’s complaint is frivolous; but, it is not required to do so.186 It seems illogical
that whistleblowers will inevitably recover something either under the statute, by settlement, or by filing private claims if the Government declines to intervene, when
defendants are not guaranteed any kind of damages if the plaintiff files a frivolous suit.
FERA does not include any procedural protections for defendants on this issue.
Given the holes in FERA where procedural protections could have been, but were
not inserted for the protection of defendants, the substantial increase in the defendant’s
interest because of the expansive liability created by FERA, and the procedural defenses which take away the defendant’s already meager protections, FERA’s changes
to the FCA create a due process violation where before there was an infringement.
CONCLUSION
There have been few cases decided since FERA’s passage, and most of these cases
have considered the ex post facto argument,187 though defendants have made arguments
that FERA’s whistleblower provisions have violated the Due Process Clause as well.188
185

ACLU v. Holder, 652 F. Supp. 2d 654, 659 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, No. 09-2086, 2011 WL
1108252 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011). The ACLU further challenged FERA’s whistleblower provisions by also arguing that the seal provisions under the FCA are content-based restrictions
that prevent the relator from discussing the case in violation of the relator’s First Amendment
rights. Id. The district court ruled against the ACLU. Id. at 671.
186
See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) § 4(d).
187
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, which provides: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.”
188
See United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D.
Ohio 2009) (holding that “retroactive application of the amendments to the FCA violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause because retroactive application of the amendments to the FCA would
impose punishment for acts that were not punishable prior to the enactment of the amendments”); United States v. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (D. Del. 2009) (finding that
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Several commentators have argued that the new provisions will result in violations of
the Due Process and Ex Post Facto clauses of the Constitution.189 Because of FERA’s
new provisions expanding liability, it is crucial that defendants be given notice of the
suit after a certain period of time. I suggest that, at the very least, the Government not
be able to relate back its complaint in intervention and additional claims once the
statute of limitations period has passed, or be required to give defendants notice if it
intends to do so. While this procedure would not entirely solve the problems faced by
defendants during the interim period, at least it would give them some certainty as to
when one-sided discovery would end.190
In addition, because liability under the FCA has been drastically expanded, and
because the FCA has been found by courts to be punitive in nature,191 there should be
some kind of flexibility in the fines doled out for a violation of the FCA. Instead of
imposing treble damages and a fine of $11,000 per false claim made on all contractors
who submit a false claim, it may make more sense to carry on the distinction from the
old FCA with respect to intent in this regard.192
FERA provides many positive changes to the FCA that allow the federal government to go further than ever before to catch contractors perpetrating fraud upon the
federal purse. These amendments will certainly have a beneficial, long ranging effect.
However, some of the whistleblower provisions go too far given the current protections
for defendants, and must be checked by amending the FCA to add new procedural protections for defendants. Whatever the procedural solution, it is clear that there is a
very real danger that defendants’ due process rights have and will be violated. These
violations cannot continue.

FERA’s amendments were not to be applied retroactively “because it would increase [a] defendant’s liability for past conduct”); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 87, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2009) (reasoning that defendant’s claims did not fall under the
new definition of “claim” in FERA because the claims were pending prior to June 7, 2008).
189
See generally JONES DAY supra note 7; Comeau, supra note 90, at 512 (arguing that
FERA will give rise to constitutional challenges).
190
It has also been suggested by Frank LaSalle in his comment, The Civil False Claims Act:
The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, that increasing “the
burden of proof required to prove a false claim by [shedding the] preponderance of the evidence standard” and imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard would remedy some
of whistleblowers’ worst abuses of the statute. 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 500, 503 (1995).
191
See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
784–86 (2000) (holding that the treble damages provisions under the FCA are “essentially punitive in nature”); see also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 n.5 (1976) (noting that
the FCA “was adopted ‘for the purpose of publishing and preventing . . . frauds’”) (internal
citation omitted).
192
That is to say, those with an “intent” to defraud the Government under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A) (2006).

